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Abstract
This paper models competition between firm/market-makers. There are two goods, a
divisible numeraire and an indivisible good produced by firms.  The set of active consumers is
random; all consumers are identical, conditional on arriving at the market.  First, firms produce
output (equivalently, install capacity) and commit to a transactions mechanism.  Next, nature
chooses the set of consumers at the market, and each active consumer commits to visit a single
firm.  All equilibria involve all firms choosing a fixed price.  Thus, price competition is derived,
not assumed.  Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D43, D83, L13.3
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1. Introduction
A substantial amount of research has been devoted to the analysis of price competition
between firms.  However, relatively little research has attempted to explain why firms would
commit to a fixed price.  In this paper, firms can choose any feasible transactions mechanism,
specifying the net trades of each customer in each state of nature.  Price competition emerges
endogenously, because all equilibria involve all active firms choosing a transactions mechanism
equivalent to price fixing with rationing.
The environment can be sketched as follows.  There are two goods, an indivisible
"commodity" and a perfectly divisible "numeraire."  The set of consumers who arrive at the
market is random.  Conditional on arriving, all consumers are identical, with a utility function that
is concave over numeraire consumption.  Each risk-neutral firm must produce output (or, given
an alternative interpretation, install capacity) before the realization of random demand.  At the
same time a firm chooses its output, it must also commit to a transactions mechanism.  That is, a
firm must specify a function that maps each subset of consumers and the order of their arrival into
a vector of net trades.  The only restrictions placed on the space of mechanisms is that they be
anonymous and that they be ex-post individually rational for consumers (no one pays more than
his/her valuation and no one is required to pay unless he/she consumes the commodity).  Then
each consumer at the market, knowing the outputs and transactions mechanisms of all firms, must
choose a firm. 
After setting up the model in Section 2 and proving some preliminary results about the
consumer subgame in Section 3, the main results are proven in Section 4.  Theorem 1 states that5
any equilibrium involves all active firms choosing to fix prices.  Theorem 2 states that any
equilibrium of the price-competition game (where firms are required to fix prices) is an
equilibrium of the larger game (where firms can choose any feasible transactions mechanism). 
Thus, we can focus on the simpler price-competition game, since it has the same set of equilibria
as the larger game.
Of course, the fact that all arriving consumers are of the same "type" simplifies the space
of transactions mechanisms.  In particular, consumers do not send messages to the mechanism.  In
McAfee [1993], the aggregate number of buyers is known, but their valuations are heterogeneous
and random.  Firms are assumed to have one unit to sell, and they compete by offering any
transactions mechanism.  In equilibrium, firms choose to run the same, efficient auction. 
McAfee's [1993] setting is quite complicated, and he requires sellers to ignore the impact of their
actions on the expected payoffs that buyers receive from other sellers.  In Peters [1994], firms
take into account their effect on the expected payoffs buyers receive from other sellers, but this
effect disappears in the limit, as the number of sellers approaches infinity.  Peters [1994] also
allows sellers as well as buyers to be heterogeneous.  By focusing on the symmetric buyer case,
we can incorporate production decisions and uncertainty about the number of arriving buyers.  At
the same time, there is no implicit or explicit assumption about a large number of firms.
 
2. The Model
There are two types of agents, consumers and firm-owning entrepreneurs.  There are two
physical commodities:  a numeraire commodity, y, and a commodity produced by firms, x. 
Consumers demand either zero or one unit of commodity x.  The total number of potential6
consumers, indexed by i and j, is J.  However, the number of active consumers will generally be
less than J.  The number of firms, indexed by f and h, is F.  
Firms are risk neutral, seeking to maximize expected profits.  That is, firm f is an
entrepreneur that cares only about numeraire consumption,  y .  Commodity x  is produced from f
an input Y according to the production function x  =  g(Y), where g is assumed to be strictly f f f f f
monotonic, concave, and continuously differentiable for f = 1, ... , F.  It follows that we can invert
g to find the firm's cost function,  c(x) =  g (x), which must be strictly increasing and convex. f f f f f
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Consumers are assumed to have identical preferences over certain consumption.  All
consumers active at the market are endowed with   units of commodity y and zero units of
commodity x.  Consumers have the utility function given by u(x) + v(y).  We assume 
u(1) > u(0) = 0, v'(y) > 0,  v''(y) < 0, and that consumers are von Neumann-Morgenstern expected
utility maximizers.  
The timing of decisions is as follows:  First, each of the F firms simultaneously chooses
output and a transactions mechanism (to be described below).  Next, a subset of the J potential
consumers becomes active.  Each active consumer must commit to a particular firm, knowing the
outputs and transactions mechanisms of all firms.  Finally, uncertainty is resolved and trade
occurs.
It will be useful to separate two distinct sources of uncertainty in the model.  First, there is
the "aggregate demand state," denoted by s = 1, ... , S.  The aggregate demand state specifies how
many consumers arrive at the market, the identities of those consumers, and the order of arrival. 
The probability of aggregate demand state s is denoted by µ(s).  Second, there is the
endogenously created uncertainty over which firms these active consumers choose to visit.  We7
focus on equilibria in which all active consumers choose the same mixed strategy vector,  , where
  represents the probability of an active consumer choosing firm f. f
Before fully defining the games   and  , some additional notation will be necessary.  Let 
p
   represent the vector of consumers arriving at firm f.  That is, if the jth component of   is f + f
J
K, then consumer j is the Kth consumer to arrive at firm f; if the jth component of   is 0, then f
consumer j does not visit firm f.  Denote the (finite) set of possible arrival vectors as  .  Given 
    , denote the set of customers visiting firm f as C. In general, many components of   will be f f f
zero, because some consumers are not active and some active consumers choose to visit other
firms.  Let   be defined by   =  (  , ... ,   , ... ,   ).  Given the measure over aggregate demand 1 f F
states, µ, and the mixed strategy chosen by active consumers,  , a probability measure over   is
uniquely determined.  To conserve notation (while slightly abusing it), we denote both the
unconditional and conditional probabilities of events related to   as  ( ) or   ( ).  
An "arrival event" contains all aggregate demand states in which we observe a particular
number of active consumers at the market.  Denote the arrival event by e, where we have 
e = 1, ... , E.  The unconditional probability of arrival event e, by definition, is   µ(s).  Let the s e
number of active consumers in arrival event e be given by n(e).  Define the maximum possible
number of active consumers by  n   =  max  n(e).  Finally, let the number of consumers visiting
max
e
firm f under   be denoted #C .  f f
A firm’s transactions mechanism specifies the allocation of goods x and y received by each
of its customers, as a function of the firm’s arrival vector.  Here, a consumer’s allocation is
characterized by whether or not the consumer purchases good x, and if so, the price paid.  In
Definition (2.1) below, we use the convention that non-customers receive an allocation of zero.f ( f) yf( f)
(2.2) f f f ( f j Cf) [u(xj( f)) v(yj( f))],
tf :
2J .
  Our results are completely unaffected if we allow firms to choose mechanisms that
1
randomize over allocations.  This is because firms are allowed to condition the allocation on the
arrival order of customers, which serves as the randomizing device.  Indeed, if we allowed firms
to choose mechanisms that randomize, we could drop all mention of arrival orders.  The present
specification is used to avoid further complicating the notation.
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Definition 2.1:  A transactions mechanism for firm f, denoted by t , is a function mapping each f 
  into an allocation   f
1
A transactions mechanism is anonymous if, for all consumers j and i, switching j and i in   results f
in an allocation with the consumption vectors of j and i switched, while everyone else's
consumption remains unchanged.
The objective function of firm f is given by
 where y( ) denotes consumption of the numeraire by firm f when its arrival vector is   .   f f f
Consumers are assumed to face the same distribution of market conditions when they are
active.  This symmetry is captured in the following assumption.  Conditional on consumer j being
at the market, the probability of arrival event e is independent of j and denoted by µ(e).  Given e
and the set of active consumers, all orders of arrival are equally likely.  Given that all consumers
use the mixed strategy  , an active consumer, j, seeks to maximize the utility function 9
where  x( ) and y( ) represent consumer j's consumption when he/she visits firm j and the j f j f
arrival vector is   . f
Definition 2.3:  A transactions mechanism, t   T, is said to be feasible if and only if the f
following  conditions are satisfied for all   : f
firm f's input vector Y satisfies    x(  )   g(Y )  , f j Cf j f f f
 y(  ) +     y(  )         +       -  Y , f f j Cf j f f j Cf f
t  is anonymous, and f
for  j   C ,  x(  ) = 0 implies  y(  ) =   (consumers cannot commit to pay without f j f j f
receiving commodity x).
Definition (2.3) says that feasible transactions mechanisms satisfy materials balance, anonymity,
and the constraint that consumers cannot commit to pay without receiving commodity x.  The set
of feasible transactions mechanisms is denoted by T.
Definition 2.4:  A transactions mechanism, t   T, is equivalent to price fixing with rationing if it f
is feasible and there exists p such that  x(  ) = 1 implies  y(  ) =   -  p for all  j   C  and for all  j f j f f
 
    .  The set of transactions mechanisms equivalent to price fixing with rationing is denoted by f
T .
p
The game in which firms may choose any feasible transactions mechanism,  , is defined as
follows.  Firms simultaneously choose their output, x , and a transactions mechanism, t   T, f f  Naturally, the mixed strategy,  , can depend on the subgame.  If a particular subgame
2
has several equilibrium mixed strategies that can be Pareto ranked for consumers, we assume that
one yielding the highest utility to consumers is selected.  However, we show below that subgames
of the price-competition game always have a unique equilibrium  .
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followed by active consumers choosing which firm to visit.  Consumers can choose to consume
their endowment, which we consider to be a visit to firm 0.  The aggregate demand state, s,  and
the choices of consumers determine each firm's arrival vector,   .  Active consumers receive the f
allocation promised by the firm they choose to visit:   (x(  ) , y(  )).  Firms receive as profits j f j f
their net transaction:  profits =  y(  ) -    =  [  (  - y(  )) -  Y ].  We will focus on f f f j Cf j f f
consumer-symmetric Nash equilibria (SNE), which are subgame perfect Nash equilibria in which
all active consumers choose the mixed strategy,  .   The price-competition game,  , is defined
2 p
exactly as   except that firms must choose a transactions mechanism equivalent to price fixing
with rationing,  t    T  for all f.  We allow the possibility of mixed strategies chosen by firms. f
p 
3. The Consumer Subgame
Before considering the equilibrium behavior of firms, we will need some preliminary
results about the consumer subgames of   and  .  In this section, we take the transactions
p
mechanisms chosen by firms as given.
Lemma 3.1:   For any symmetric Nash equilibrium,  , to any consumer subgame of  , the
expected utility of consumer j visiting firm f is independent of j and f whenever    >  0. f
Proof:  Given  , denote the expected utility of consumer j visiting firm f as W(f), given by j(3.2) Wj(f)
f ( f j Cf) [u(xj( f) v(yj( f))]
  When    =  0, then W(f)  =  u(x( )) + v(y( )),  where   = (0,0, ... ,0,1,0, ... 0,0).  In
3
f j j f j f f
other words, consumer j is assured of being the only consumer visiting firm f.
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when     >  0.   Since all consumers are using the same mixed strategy, and from our maintained f
3
assumptions on aggregate demand states, it follows that  (#C = n  j   C) is independent of j.  f f
Anonymity along with the assumption that all orders of arrival are equally likely implies that W(f) j
is independent of j.  Denote the expected utility offered by firm f as W(f).
Suppose that there are two firms, f and h, for which we have    >  0,    >  0, and W(f) > f h
W(h).  But consumer j can increase his/her own probability of choosing firm f and reduce his/her
probability of choosing h, without affecting W(f) or W(h), since  (    j C) does not depend on j j f f
the mixed strategy of consumer j.  This is inconsistent with   being an equilibrium to the
consumer subgame, so we must have W(f) = W(h) = W.   
The first part of the proof of Lemma (3.1) shows that W(f) will be independent of j j
whenever all consumers are choosing the same strategy,  , irregardless of whether   is an
equilibrium.  Therefore, the following definition is well-defined.  
Definition 3.3:   Given (feasible) transactions mechanisms of firms and the mixed strategy 
chosen by all consumers, denote the expected utility of consumers offered by firm f as  ( ). f f(3.7) f
max[ 0 , f ( f( f) W)/M]
h max[ 0 , h ( h( h) W)/M]
(3.8) W maxh : h>0 h( h)
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From Lemma (3.1),   is a symmetric Nash equilibrium to the consumer subgame if and only if
there is a W such that, for f = 0,1, ... F
(3.4) ( ( )  -  W)    =  0   and    f f f
(3.5) ( )  -  W     0. f f
Lemma 3.6:   Given any (feasible) transactions mechanisms of firms, there is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium to any consumer subgame of  .
Proof:   Consider the following mapping.
The domain for the mapping (3.7)-(3.8) is given by D  { (  , W) :         and  v( )   W   
F+1
u(1) + v( ) }.  Consumers will only visit firms h for which   ( )    v( ) holds, so the absolute h h
value of  ( ) - W is uniformly bounded below u(1).  Since   > 1/(1+F) must hold for some h h h
such firm h, the denominator in (3.7) will be strictly positive for M > (1+F)u(1).  From the fact
that  ( ) is a continuous function, the mapping (3.7)-(3.8) is continuous.  Also, D is a convex, f f
compact set.  By Brouwer's theorem, the mapping has a fixed point.
At the fixed-point  (  , W), define Z byZ h max[ 0 , h ( h( h) W)/M].
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From (3.7), we have for all firms f, 
(3.9)   Z  =  max[ 0 ,    + (  ( ) - W ) / M ]. f f f f
Consider the firm, h, for whom    > 0  and   ( ) = W.  We know from (3.8) that there is such a h h h
firm.  Looking at equation (3.9) for firm h, it follows that Z = 1.  Therefore, (3.9) simplifies to
(3.10)   =  0  and    ( )     W          or          ( )  =  W. f f f f f
The equations and inequalities of (3.10) imply (3.4) and (3.5), so the fixed point is a symmetric
Nash equilibrium of the consumer subgame.   
Typically, firm f's profits are strictly increasing in    and the utility offered by firm f,  f
( ) , is strictly decreasing in   .   The intuition is that higher   means more customers, which f f f f
benefits the firm and hurts the customers.  Although it is possible to construct transactions
mechanisms for which  ( ) is not a decreasing function, this is impossible for non-wasteful f f
mechanisms equivalent to price fixing with rationing.  It is easy to see that  ( ) is strictly f f
decreasing if  t   T  and the following conditions are satisfied:   f
p14
(3.11) (i)   t  is non-wasteful, so that    x( )  =  min[ x , #C ],   f j Cf  j f f f
(ii)   x  <  n  ,   and    f
max
(iii)  firm f's price satisfies p  <  p ,  where p  solves   u(1) + v( - p ) = v( ). f
max max max
Condition (3.11) guarantees that there is some chance a consumer visiting firm f is rationed, and
that consumers visiting firm f strictly prefer not to be rationed.
Lemma 3.12:   If all firms are choosing transactions mechanisms  t   T    satisfying (3.11), then f
p
the resulting consumer subgame has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium  .
Proof:   Lemma (3.6) guarantees that there is at least one symmetric Nash equilibrium.  To show
that it is unique, suppose that there are two equilibria,   and  .  Without loss of generality, let 
  >     >  0  and  0  <     <     hold for two firms, f   h.  Since    and    are strictly f f h h f h
decreasing, we have   (  ) <  ( )  and   (  ) >  ( ).  However, Lemma (3.1) implies that  f f f f h h h h
(  )  =   (  )   and    ( )  =   ( ), a contradiction.    f f h h f f h h
In order to prove our main results, we must ensure that a price-fixing firm will choose a
price and quantity satisfying (3.11).  Essentially, the highest possible demand must be too unlikely
or too costly for one firm to serve.  The following condition on costs is sufficient.
(3.13) c '(n )  >   p  µ(n ) for all f. f
max max max  For a proof of this claim, see Peck [1993, Proposition 4.7].
4
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Condition (3.13) is by no means necessary, since the likelihood of some consumers choosing other
firms will dissuade firm f from producing  n  units of output.
max
4. The Main Theorems
In this section, we provide two results about the emergence of price competition. 
Theorem 1 shows that for any SNE of   , all participating firms choose a transactions mechanism
equivalent to price-fixing with rationing.  Theorem 2 shows that any SNE of    is also a SNE of
p
.  Thus, the two games have the same set of SNE.  
The notation used in this section treats the mixed strategy chosen by consumers and
consumers' utility as functions of the transactions mechanisms chosen by firms.
Theorem 1: If condition (3.13) is satisfied, then for any SNE of  , we have  t   T   for all f
p 
firms f  producing output.  In other words, all active firms choose a mechanism equivalent to
price fixing with rationing. 
Proof:   Suppose there is a SNE of   and some firm f choosing a mixed strategy that assigns
positive probability to a transactions mechanism, t , for which output is positive and we have   f
t     T   T .  Given the transactions mechanisms chosen by the other firms, given   , and given f f
p 
the utility W, firm f can increase consumer utility without affecting expected profits by smoothing
the numeraire consumption of consumers receiving the good, i.e., by charging a fixed price.  By
raising the price appropriately, firm f can increase profits and maintain consumer utility at W,  in
416
which case    remains an optimal strategy for consumers.   f
Thus, there is an alternative transactions mechanism    for which we have:   f
(4.1)      T ,  f
p 
(4.2)   (  ;   )  =    (  ; t )  for any    (equilibrium or not),  and   f f f f f f f
(4.3)  firm f earns strictly higher profits under   than under t , given  .   f f f
Claim:   (  ;   ) is a strictly decreasing function of   . f f f f
Proof of Claim:  We must show that    satisfies condition (3.11).  Without loss of generality,    is f f
non-wasteful, or else an even more profitable deviation exists, given   .  Inequality (3.13) f
guarantees that under    ,  x  <  n  holds, again w.l.o.g. f f
max
Let  (t , t- ) denote the mixed strategy chosen by consumers in the SNE when the f f
transactions mechanisms are (t , t- ).  From Lemma (3.1), there is an equilibrium expected utility f f
offered to all consumers, which we denote by W(t , t- ).   Consider the new consumer f f
equilibrium,  (  , t- ), that prevails when firm f deviates to   , and let the equilibrium expected f f f
utility of the new consumer subgame be denoted by W(  , t- ).  We know there is such an f f
equilibrium by Lemma (3.6). 
If  p  =  p holds under   , then firm f offers consumers their reservation utility level f f
max 
under   , so (4.2) and Lemma (3.1) imply W(t , t- ) = v( ) for all  t-  such that   (t , t- ) > 0.  f f f f f f f
If firm f never receives any customers in the SNE, so we have   (t , t- ) = 0 for all  t- , then firm f f f f
f cannot be maximizing profits by producing positive output.  If firm f always receives all17
customers in the SNE, so we have   (t , t- ) = 1 for all  t- , then firms other than f must always f f f f
be producing zero output.  Thus, firm f must always be setting  p  =  p  to extract all surplus, f
max
contradicting t    T   T .  If  0 <   (t , t- ) < 1 holds for some  t-  that occurs with positive f f f f f
p 
probability in the SNE, we can construct an even better fixed-price deviation for firm f,  
p  =  p -  , offer consumers better than their reservation utility and guarantee that all f
max 
consumers choose firm f.  The discrete decrease in expected unsold goods swamps the effect of
lower price for small enough  .  This completes the claim.
To compare the possible consumer subgames under    and under t , we have two cases, f f
which depend on  t- . f
Case 1:  W(  , t- ) > W(t , t- )   for a given t- . f f f f f
Since   (    ;   )  =   (    ; t )  holds for any mixed strategy chosen by consumers,  (  , t- )  (as f f f f f f
well as  (t , t- )) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium to the consumer subgame in which firms play f f
(t , t- ).  Since there is a symmetric Nash equilibrium to the consumer subgame (t , t- ) yielding f f f f
all consumers higher expected utility,  (t , t- ) would not have been selected (see footnote 1), f f
contradicting the definition of a SNE.
Case 2:   W(  , t- )   W(t , t- )   for a given t- . f f f f f
So far, we have that  W(  , t- ) =  ( (  , t- ) ;   )  =   ( (  , t- ) ; t )  and   f f f f f f f f f f f f
W(t , t- ) =  ( (t , t- ) ;   )  =   ( (t , t- ) ; t ).  Therefore, we have f f f f f f f f f f f f
( (  , t- ) ;   )       ( (t , t- ) ;   ).  Since  (   ;   ) is a strictly decreasing function, it f f f f f f f f f f f f  Peters [1984] considers a game in which firms install capacity and fix prices, followed by
5
the arrival of consumers, who must commit to a single firm.  The firm then produces (divisible)
output to order, up to capacity.  The present results cannot be applied to his setting.
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follows that   (t , t- )       (  , t- )  holds.  Firm f's profits would have been strictly higher f f f f f f
under    than under t  if consumers had maintained the same mixed strategy,  (t , t- ),  by (4.3) f f f f f
in the construction of   .  Consumers are at least as likely to choose firm f under    than under t, f f f
so it follows that firm f's profits under    are at least as high as they would have been if f
consumers had maintained their old mixed strategy; this is because the likelihood of unsold goods
is lower.  Therefore, the deviation to    results in strictly higher profits for firm f whenever  t-  f f
puts us in Case 2. 
Recapitulating, we see that Case 1 is impossible and that Case 2 leads to higher profits. 
Therefore, the deviation to    results in strictly higher profits for firm f, no matter what f
transactions mechanisms are chosen by the other firms.  This contradicts the supposition that  t  is f
played with positive probability in a SNE.   
 
Theorem 1 demonstrates that the competition of all feasible transactions mechanisms will
lead to the emergence of price competition with rationing.  The obvious implication is that price
competition is worthy of study.  Several papers have studied models in which firms must fix prices
and produce or install capacity in advance of demand uncertainty, followed by the arrival of
consumers who must commit to a firm.  See, for example, Carlton [1978] or Deneckere and Peck
[1995].    Theorem 2 demonstrates that any equilibrium of   is also an equilibrium of  . 
5 p
Together, Theorems 1 and 2 imply that    and    have the same set of SNE, so we can focus on
  p  See Peck [1993, Proposition 4.7] for a proof.
6
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the simpler game,   .  Analysis where firms are assumed to engage in price-competition  extends
p
to the present context of competition over transactions mechanisms.
Theorem 2:   Suppose condition (3.13) is satisfied and (z , ... , z , ... , z ) are the firms' mixed 1 f  F
strategies in a SNE of      .  Then we also have a SNE to    if firms play (z , ... , z , ... , z ), no
p
1 f  F
matter which equilibria are selected in the consumer subgames. 
Proof:  Suppose we have a SNE of   that is not a SNE of  .  Denote the consumers' mixed
p
strategy in a SNE of   when the transactions mechanisms are (t , t- ) as  (t , t- ).  Then there is f f f f
a firm, f, and a transactions mechanism, t    T   T , for which firm f receives higher profits in  f
p 
under  t  than under  z , given  z- .   f f  f 
Given the transactions mechanisms of firms other than f (that arise with positive
probability under z- ),  t- , denote the expected utility received in the consumer subgame by  f f
W(t , t- ), which is well defined because of Lemma (3.1).  If we have  (t , t- ) = 0 for all  t- f f f f f f
that arise with positive probability, then firm f receives 0 profit under the deviation, and therefore
receives negative profits under z .  This is inconsistent with (z , ... , z , ... , z ) being the firms' f  1 f  F
strategies in a SNE of   .
p
We conclude that  (t , t- ) > 0 holds for some t- arising with positive probability under  f f f f
z- .  By smoothing numeraire consumption of customers who receive the good and extracting the f
surplus, it follows  that there is an alternative transactions mechanism    for which we have:  (i) 
6
f
   T , (ii)   (  ;   )  =    (  ; t )  for any    (equilibrium or not), and  (iii)  firm f earns f f f f f f f f
p    See Prescott and Townsend [1984], Rogerson [1988], Shell and Wright [1993], and
7
Garratt [1991] for an analysis of lottery equilibria with indivisibilities and certain demand and
supply; see Peck [1993] for the distinction between lotteries and raffles when demand is uncertain.
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strictly higher profits under   than under t , given consumers choose the mixed strategy  .   f f f
Therefore,  (t , t- ) remains an equilibrium to the consumer subgame in which firm f f f
deviates to   .  Condition (3.13) allows us to apply Lemma (3.12), so that  (t , t- ) must be f f f
chosen by consumers in response to the deviation.  Thus,    results in strictly higher profits for f
firm f than t , no matter what transactions mechanisms are being chosen by other firms.  f
However,  t  strictly dominates  z , so    strictly dominates z  and is in T .  This contradicts the f f f f
p 
fact that (z , ... , z , ... , z ) can be the firms' strategies in a SNE of   .    1 f  F
p
Remark 4.4:   The intuition for the emergence of price competition is the following.  If a firm
forces consumers to bear price risk, there is an alternative mechanism that smooths the numeraire
consumption of customers receiving the good, generating extra profits without disturbing the
mixed strategy chosen by consumers.  In other words, firms offer as much insurance over price
fluctuations as possible.  The "first best" would be to have all customers pay a fixed fee for a
chance at receiving the good, with the chance depending on the realization of demand.  If there is
excess supply at the firm, all customers consume the good; if there is excess demand, then all
output is allocated by means of a raffle.   If customers cannot commit to pay without receiving
7
commodity x, then a first-best raffle is not feasible.  Of feasible transactions mechanisms, firm f
attains the highest profits for a given consumer utility level by smoothing the numeraire
consumption of customers receiving the good.  The amount of numeraire consumption given up
for commodity x is, by definition, the fixed price.  Proving Theorems 1 and 2 is complicated21
because there may be multiple equilibria to the consumer subgame resulting from a deviation.
Remark 4.5:   It is important to allow for equilibria in which firms choose mixed strategies in
Theorems 1 and 2, because pure-strategy equilibrium often fails to exist.  The nonexistence of
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium under Bertrand competition with certain demand is well known. 
For a game similar to    , Deneckere and Peck [1995] show that whenever there is demand
p
uncertainty and a sufficient number of firms, there exists a Nash equilibrium in which all  firms
choose pure strategies.  However, if demand does not fluctuate much and the number of firms is
small, then firms must use mixed strategies in any Nash equilibrium.
5. Allowing Consumers to Visit Several Firms
In this section, we explore the degree to which the model could be generalized to allow
consumers to visit several firms instead of just one.  If Theorems 1 and 2 were to remain valid, the
set of environments in which price competition could be expected to arise endogenously would be
expanded.  The first issue to confront is a modelling issue: without additional structure on the
model, a transactions mechanism is ill-defined.  Some consumers might decide to opt out of a
firm’s mechanism, and other consumers who initially visited another firm might want to opt in. 
We must specify the process by which each consumer receives commitments from firms, makes
commitments to firms, and eventually becomes a single firm’s customer.
We focus attention here to the case in which customers who do not purchase can visit
other firms.  That is, we have the following timing: (1) firms simultaneously choose output and
functions mapping arrival vectors to feasible net trades, (2) consumers commit to visit a firm and22
abide by the mechanism if allowed to purchase, (3) each firm chooses a second-round function
mapping its arrival vector to net trades, where feasibility is with respect to remaining output, (4)
previously unmatched consumers commit to visit a (possibly different) firm and abide by its
second-round transactions mechanism if allowed to purchase, and so on until there is a round with
no transactions made. 
The added complication is that the utility of unmatched consumers is not fixed, but
depends on the continuation payoff of entering the next round.  Now the utility of consumers
visiting firm f,  ( ), implicitly depends on firm f’s current transactions mechanism and the f f
continuation payoff, which depends on the equilibrium of the ensuing subgame.  Not only does     f
affect the outcome of the current mechanism, but    could also affect the continuation payoff for f
those who do not purchase.
With this complication, the proof of Theorems 1 and 2 can almost, but not quite, proceed
unchanged.  For Theorem 1, suppose that there is a SNE of   in which some firm f  (whose
remaining output is positive) chooses a transactions mechanism, t , in which t    T   T .  Then f f
p 
firm f can profitably deviate by choosing a fixed price mechanism that smooths the numeraire
consumption of its buyers, while maintaining the same expected utility if the ensuing subgame is
unaltered.  We know that it is consistent with equilibrium to have the ensuing subgame unaltered,
so that consumers visit firm f with probability   .  This is because the amount of output each firm f
has remaining and the number of consumers waiting to purchase are unchanged.  The problem lies
in demonstrating that no other equilibrium of the subgame will be chosen in response to firm f’s
deviation.  
When consumers can only visit one firm, showing that   ( ) is strictly decreasing in   , f f f23
given firm f’s fixed price mechanism, allows us to prove Theorems 1 and 2.  For the multiple-
round game considered in this section, while  ( ) may typically be strictly decreasing, no f f
condition along the lines of (3.11) is readily available, for the following reasons.  First, there is no
easy guarantee that consumers strictly prefer to purchase.  The utility of not purchasing now
depends on the endogenous continuation game, rather than simply the reservation utility level.
Second, consumers choosing firm f in round 2 could know that they will not be rationed, in which
case higher   would not affect the utility offered by firm f.  This will occur if the number of f
consumers is small but many of them happened to choose the same firm in round 1.  Third, it is
possible for higher   to increase the continuation payoff, for example by shifting consumers f
across firms in a way that reduces the market power of firms with output remaining.  If this effect
is strong enough,  ( ) could be increasing.   f f
6. Concluding Remarks
Our results strongly depend on the assumption that consumers are identical, conditional on
arriving at the market.  Allowing heterogeneous preferences would create a tradeoff in which
fixing prices benefits consumers by eliminating price risk but also hurts some consumers by
introducing allocative inefficiencies.  It would be a difficult and entirely new project to solve the
game in which firms can select a transactions mechanism with the allocation being a function of
the preference-type reported by customers.  Gilbert and Klemperer [1993] look at a model in
which a monopolistic firm must balance the incentive to induce ex ante investment by consumers
and the incentive to efficiently allocate output ex post.  In their model, consumers are
heterogeneous, and it is shown that the optimal mechanism might involve price fixing and  If output is not observable, the firm might want to underproduce.  However, there is no
8
incentive to withhold output from customers.
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rationing.  Allowing competition between firms in Gilbert and Klemperer [1993] would greatly
complicate the situation.
The risk aversion of consumers leads to their desire to have numeraire consumption
smoothed over states of nature, which leads to the result that all SNE involve all firms choosing
to fix prices.  However, even if the purchases are small relative to incomes, so that risk neutrality
is the more reasonable assumption, there will always be some SNE in which all firms choose to fix
prices.  Price competition remains an equilibrium transactions mechanism.  Also, Theorem 2
shows that our analysis of the game in which price competition is assumed is free from the
criticism that the equilibrium would disappear when other transactions mechanisms are allowed.
Since price fixing is simple, it would not be hard to introduce costs of implementation to
the model and conclude that price fixing uniquely emerges, even under risk neutrality.  Price fixing
has some other desirable features not captured in the present analysis.  When consumers must
transact immediately, before all consumers arrive at the firm, price fixing with first-come-first-
served rationing is easy to implement; other transactions mechanisms, like market clearing, require
the firm's entire arrival vector to be known before any transactions are finalized, which might not
be feasible in practice.  Second, there is the issue of commitment to a transactions mechanism. 
Any attempt to charge a customer more than the announced, fixed price is immediately apparent
to the customer and might be legally verifiable; clearly, the firm does not benefit from selling at a
lower price or withholding the output for customers yet to arrive.   Other transactions
8
mechanisms, like market clearing, might allow the firm to mask a departure from the announced  In a "Bud-lite" commercial, a bartender pretends that only one beer is left, forcing the
9
two customers to bid for it.  Even if everyone knows there are two beers left, the bar could
employ a "shill" to create the appearance of excess demand.
25
transactions mechanism.  For example, the firm could claim that demand was high, necessitating a
high price.   
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